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RECENT CASES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-APPELLATE PROCEDURE-DETERMINING
POINT OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT--STACHLOWSKI V STACH,

328 N.C. 276, 401 S.E.2d 638 (1991)
Because the limitations period for filing a notice of appeal is triggered by the entry of judgment, 1 the exact point of entry must be easily
identifiable.2 Unfortunately, neither rule 3 of the North Carolina Rules
of Appellate Procedure,3 which provides that written notice of appeal
must be taken within thirty days after entry of judgment, nor rule 58 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 which governs entry of judgment generally, defines clearly the point of entry in all cases. Rule 58 provides that
entry of judgment occurs when the clerk makes a notation of the court's
judgment in its minutes.5 The rule is silent on when entry of judgment
occurs in the many cases in which the clerk makes no such notation. In
Stachlowski v. Stach6 the North Carolina Supreme Court failed to resolve
these lingering questions surrounding entry of judgment. Attempting to
fill the gaps in rule 58, the court set forth a three-factor test for determining when judgment is entered in cases that rule 58 does not foresee. 7
Although this test resolved the problem presented in Stach, the factors
that constitute it are so malleable that the test fails to provide the predictability future appellants need to preserve their rights. As a result, the
only safe course of action for North Carolina practitioners is to file for
appeal within thirty days from when judgment is rendered orally by a
trial court.
On January 17, 1989, a Person County trial court, after hearing the
evidence regarding plaintiff's suit seeking modification of a child custody
order, announced its judgment in open court.8 The court ruled that it
would give full faith and credit to the original order, noting that there
had been no material change in the circumstances.9 It then directed
1. WILLIAM A. SHUFORD, NORTH CAROLINA
3 (3d ed. 1988).
2. N.C. R. Civ. P. 58 cmt.
3. N.C. R. App. P. 3.
4. N.C. R. Civ. P. 58.

5. Id.
6. 328 N.C. 276, 401 S.E.2d 638 (1991).
7. Id. at 287, 401 S.E.2d at 645.
8. Id. at 277, 401 S.E.2d at 639.

9. Id.

CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

58-
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counsel for the defendant to draft the order. 10 The court did not direct
the clerk to enter judgment, nor did the clerk make a notation of the
judgment in the minutes of the court.'1 The judge signed the order April
6, 1989, almost three months later, on which date plaintiff filed a written
notice of appeal. 2
A divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that
the plaintiff's appeal was untimely under rule 3 of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure because he did not fie it within ten days 3 of the "entry" of
judgment; entry, the majority held, occurred on January 17, when the
trial court orally pronounced its decision on the custody issue. 4 The
supreme court reversed. In some circumstances, the high court explained, rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure identifies precisely when
the trial court's judgment is deemed entered."1 All three situations that
rule 58 contemplates, however, involve some action by the clerk of
court. 6 The trial court's decision in Stach, by contrast, was not noted by
10. Id. The order was also to include visitation privileges still under negotiation. Id.
11. Id. at 280-81, 401 S.E.2d at 641.
12. Id. at 278, 401 S.E.2d at 640.
13. In July 1989, the General Assembly amended rule 3 of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure, increasing the time period for giving notice of appeal to 30 days after the
entry of judgment. N.C. R. Alp. P. 3. The Stach court, however, analyzed the case according
to the law at the time of the trial. Stach, 328 N.C. at 277, 401 S.E.2d at 639; see N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-279 (1983), repealedby Act of June 21, 1989, ch. 377, § 1, 1989 N.C. Laws 830, 830.
At the same time that the General Assembly repealed § 1-279, it added a provision making the
rules of appellate procedure operative in deciding the timing of appeal. Act of June 21, 1989,
ch. 377, § 2, 1989 N.C. Laws 830, 830-31 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-279.1
(Supp. 1991) ("Any party entitled by law to appeal ... may take appeal by giving notice of
appeal within the time, in the manner, and with the effect provided in the rules of appellate
procedure.").
14. Stach, 328 N.C. at 287, 401 S.E.2d at 645. The court of appeals stated, in a threeparagraph opinion, that a party must give written notice of appeal within ten days of "entry"
of judgment under rule 3 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Stachlowski v.
Stach, 98 N.C. App. 668, 669, 391 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1990), rev'd, 328 N.C. 276, 401 S.E.2d 638
(1991). Furthermore, the date of entry is not the formal signing, but the date that oral notice
is given in open court. Id. Thus, because the trial court announced its judgment on January
17, the notice of appeal of April 6 was well beyond the required period for filing. Id. at 669-70,
391 S.E.2d at 850.
15. Stach, 328 N.C. at 287, 401 S.E.2d at 645. The court also drew a distinction between
"rendering" judgment, which is the stating or announcing of judgment, and "entering" judgment. Id. at 278, 401 S.E.2d at 640.
16. N.C. R. CIv. P. 58. First, when there is a jury verdict or decision by a judge in open
court that a party may recover "only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be denied...
in the absence of contrary direction by the judge," entry occurs when the clerk makes a notation in his minutes of the decision. Id. Second, "[i]n other cases where the judgment is rendered in open court," the clerk should make a notation "as the judge may direct" that will
constitute entry. Id. Finally, "[i]n cases where judgment is not rendered in open court," entry
does not take place until the clerk has received an order for entry of judgment from the judge,
filed it, and mailed notice of the filing to the parties. Id.
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the clerk, and thus did not fit into any of the rule 58 scenarios.1 7 According to the supreme court, when the express provisions of rule 58 are inap-

plicable, three factors should be used to determine the point of entry of
judgment: (1) easy identification by the parties, (2) fair notice to the parties, and (3) finality of the trial court's decision.' 8 Although these factors
are judicially created, the court believed that they satisfy the principle
that, despite its lack of direct applicability, "the intent and purpose of
[rule 58] should nevertheless guide . . . when entry of judgment
occur[s]."' 19

Applying the factors to Stach, the court found that because the trial
court did not direct the clerk to enter judgment, and because the trial
court ordered defense counsel to include in the order visitation privileges
that were still being negotiated, January 17-the date the judge announced his decision in court-was not easily identifiable as the date of
entry.20 Furthermore, the court stated that the trial judge's oral pronouncement did not give fair notice to the parties that judgment had
been entered. 2 In the typical case covered by the express terms of rule
5 8,22 adequate notice is provided by the clerk's notations in the minutes. 2 3 By contrast, in cases like Stach, when the judge makes a "contrary direction" such as ordering counsel to draft the judgment, the other
parties at the time of the in-court pronouncement do not have notice of

the details of the judgment.24 The court thus concluded that when rule
58 does not expressly apply, "fair notice concerns indicate that 'entry'
occurs only after draft orders or judgments are submitted to and adopted
17. Stach, 328 N.C. at 281, 401 S.E.2d at 642. First, there was a "contrary direction"
given by the judge when he asked defendant's lawyer to prepare the order; thus, the situation
did not fall under the first paragraph of rule 58. Id. at 280, 401 S.E.2d at 641. Second, the
trial judge did not direct the clerk to make the notation in the minutes as required by the
second paragraph, nor was there any evidence of a notation in the minutes. Id. Finally, paragraph three did not apply because judgment was rendered in open court. Id. at 281, 401
S.E.2d at 641.
18. Id. at 282, 401 S.E.2d at 642.
19. Id. at 281, 401 S.E.2d at 642. The comment to rule 58 states that it is "highly desirable that the moment of entry of judgment be easily identifiable and it is also desirable that fair
notice be given all parties." N.C. R. Civ. P. 58 cmt. The court also said that because rule 58,
is expressly subject to rule 54(b), which defines judgments as either final or interlocutory, the
finality of the trial court's decision is also a factor in the determination. Stach, 328 N.C. at
282, 401 S.E.2d at 642; see N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
20. Stach, 328 N.C. at 283, 401 S.E.2d at 642-43.
21. Id. at 283-84, 401 S.E.2d at 643.
22. The "typical case" covered by rule 58 is a decision that a party should recover a sum
certain or costs or that all relief should be denied. Id. at 283, 401 S.E.2d at 643.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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by the court."2 5

Analyzing the "finality" prong of the three-part

test,2 6

the court ex-

plained that the principal concern addressed by this factor "is that all

matters for determination be resolved" at the time judgment is deemed
entered.27 Because the court left some of the issues to be negotiated after
January 17, that date was not appropriate as the date of entry.2" Furthermore, the court held, the finality factor must be measured by the
"extent to which the trial court may take action after entry of judgment. ' 29 While the second paragraph of rule 58, for example, allows a
court to "approve the form of the judgment and direct its prompt prepa-

ration and filing,"30 when a trial court is the finder of fact, it must comply with the requirements of rule 52 in the following order: "(1) find the
facts on all issues joined in the pleadings; (2) declare the conclusions '3of1
law arising from the facts found; and (3) enter judgment accordingly.
Thus, the court concluded that there could be no valid entry of judgment
here without findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by rule
52.32 Because the trial court had not formally made such findings and
conclusions at its oral pronouncement on January 17, that date also
failed the finality prong of the Stach test. The court necessarily concluded that entry of judgment occurred on April 6, 1989, when the trial
court signed the defendant's proposed order.3 3

The Stach court, recognizing that rule 58 does not work in all
cases,3 4 announced a test for determining the point of entry of judgment
when the rule fails. The test is applied easily when all three factors point
to the later date as they did in Stach. The court, however, gave no indi25. Id. The court was concerned about a party having to prepare an appeal "without the
benefit of the court's written order or judgment." Id.
26. Id. at 284, 401 S.E.2d at 643-44.
27. Id. at 284, 401 S.E.2d at 643.
28. The court first stated that since the parties still were negotiating visitation privileges
that were to be included in the order, the trial court's decision was not final on all matters. Id.
29. Id. at 284, 401 S.E.2d at 644.
30. N.C. R. Civ. P. 58.
31. Stach, 328 N.C. at 285, 401 S.E.2d at 644; see N.C. R. Civ. P. 52.
32. Stach, 328 N.C. at 285, 401 S.E.2d at 644. The court also noted that rule 52(b) provides for amendment to findings after the entry of judgment. Id. at 286, 401 S.E.2d at 644.
The rule states, "Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court may amend its findings... and may amend the judgment accordingly." N.C. R.
Civ. P. 52. The court reasoned that the provision would be unnecessary if findings of fact were
not required to precede the entry of judgment. Stach, 328 N.C. at 286, 401 S.E.2d at 644.
33. Stach, 328 N.C. at 287, 401 S.E.2d at 645.
34. The underlying problem in Stach was that rule 58 did not expressly apply. One commentator has said, "If any civil rule needs to be rewritten, it is Rule 58, which envisions three
scenarios for the entry of judgment, all of which rarely occur in actual practice." 2 G. GRAY
WILSON, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 58-1, at 321 (1989).
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cation how the three factors should balance against each other if each
should happen to point to a different date. Despite acknowledging that
"[fJor the purpose of determining the timeliness of appeals, the time of
entry of judgment should be established clearly,"' 35 the court crafted a
balancing test whose factors must be considered on a case-by-case basis
by courts in the future. The supreme court's holding fails to provide a
bright-line rule that practitioners need in determining when to file a written notice of appeal.
The federal entry of judgment doctrine clearly provides more predictability than the North Carolina scheme embodied in rule 58 of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and Stach. Not only does rule
58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide clearer guidelines for
entering judgment than its North Carolina counterpart, 36 but also the
federal courts require strict compliance with rule 5837 before the period
for filing an appeal begins. 38 Thus, either the moment of entry is a matter of public record available to both parties or the time for filing an
appeal is virtually unlimited. Such a system induces the prevailing party
to ensure that the court and clerk comply with rule 58 to the letter.3 9
With its three-prong test to determine the point of entry of judgment, the North Carolina Supreme Court has failed to give North Carolina practitioners needed predictability. Admittedly, in most situations
like that of Stach, the date of signing will be the date of entry. With the
Stach test, however, how can parties be sure of the exact date? One
court's interpretation of the three factors might be quite different from
that of another court. Entry of judgment should be a basic, predictable
point, requiring no judicial interpretation or application of judicially cre35. Stach, 328 N.C. at 279, 401 S.E.2d at 641.
36. Federal rule 58 states that a judgment is not effective until entered as provided in rule
79(a), which orders the clerk to keep a "civil docket" containing entries of all appearances,
orders, verdicts, and judgments. FED. R. Civ. P. 58, 79(a). The Federal Rules also state that
"[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." See FED. R. CIv. P. 58.
37. See Herrera v. First N. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 805 F.2d 896, 898-99 (10th Cir. 1986)
(holding that date of entry is the date on which the separate document is entered on the civil
docket); Chem-Haulers v. United States, 536 F.2d 610, 615 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that an
order is not final until it is entered in the civil docket).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216,221-22 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that the separate-document provision of federal rule 58 needs to be applied mechanically
"inorder to avoid new uncertainties as to the date on which judgment is entered"). Justice
Blackmun best summarized the doctrine: "Mhe separate-document requirement must be applied mechanically in order to protect a party's right of appeal, although parties may waive this
requirement in order to maintain appellate jurisdiction of their case." Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim
Heilig Oil & Gas, Inc., 479 U.S. 966, 969 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
39. See Hughes v. Halifax County Sch. Bd., 823 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir. 1987) (allowing
plaintiff to move for entry of judgment on an order pursuant to federal rule 58).
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ated standards. North Carolina's rule 58 does not give such predictability, and the holding in Stach fails to remedy the rule's deficiencies.
S. GRAHAM ROBINSON

BANKRUPTCY LAW-VALUATION OF RETAINED
COLLATERAL-BROWN & Co. SECURITIES CORP. v. BALBUS

(IN RE BALBus), 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1991)
Individual debtors, subject to certain eligibility requirements,' may
initiate a bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter 132 of the Bankruptcy
Code3 and formulate a reorganization plan directing a portion of future

earnings to creditors but providing for retention of assets. The liability of
such debtors to secured creditors in Chapter 13 depends upon section
506(a) 4 of the Bankruptcy Code, which, in part, requires bifurcating an

undersecured claim' into a secured portion to the extent of the value of
the collateral and an unsecured claim for the remainder.' Essential to
determining the extent of a debtor's liabilities, of course, is properly com1. "Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the filing of the
petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and noncontingent,
liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000... may be a debtor under Chapter 13 of this
title." 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988).
2. Id. §§ 1301-1330.
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
5. An undersecured claim is one in which the value of the creditor's claim exceeds the
value of the collateral. For example, if a creditor holds an outstanding mortgage of $100,000,
but the real property providing security for the debt is worth only $80,000, the mortgage is
undersecured by $20,000. (This example ignores sales costs.)
6. Section 506(a) provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has
an interest... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest
in the estate's interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent
that the value of such creditor's interest.., is less than the amount of such allowed
claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of
the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
The classification of a debt vitally affects repayment: a debtor in a Chapter 13 reorganization must pay secured claims in full, id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), and must pay unsecured claims
either in full, or according to the debtor's available disposable income over the next three
years, id. § 1325(b).
Because Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code applies generally to the operative bankruptcy
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puting the value of the collateral. A related issue that has split the courts
is whether hypothetical sales costs7 must be deducted from the section
506(a) valuation of secured assets that a debtor will retain in a Chapter
13 plan.' In Brown & Co. Securities Corp. v. Balbus (In re Balbus),9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that
when a debtor proposes to retain a secured asset the hypothetical cost of
selling that asset should not be subtracted from a calculation of value.' 0
As a result, Chapter 13 debtors may experience greater difficulty in meeting their obligations." Moreover, the court failed to reconcile the potentially discordant language of section 506(a). 12 A preferable approach,
one followed by a majority of courts,' 3 requires bankruptcy courts to
value the secured creditor's interest in the bankruptcy estate's interest in
14
the property with proper allowances for hypothetical liquidation costs.
chapters (Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13), the analysis presented herein remains pertinent in a
Chapter 11 context. Id. § 103(a).
7. Courts deduct estimated sales costs to reflect what the creditor could recover in a
commercially reasonable sale of the collateral. In re Boring, 91 B.R. 791, 795 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1988). Courts generally estimate prospective sales costs at 10% of collateral value. See,
e.g., In re Smith, 92 B.R. 287, 291 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); Parr v. First Ala. Bank (In re
Parr), 30 B.R. 276, 277-78 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); In re Ward, 13 B.R. 710, 712 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1981). With respect to real estate collateral, these sales cost allowances approximate the costs of "a broker's fee, title insurance, and financing costs." Wolk v. Goldome
Realty Credit Corp. (In re 222 Liberty Assocs.), 105 B.R. 798, 803 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
For a further discussion of asset valuation, including the proper charging of sales costs and
other expenses of bankruptcy administration, see David G. Carlson, Secured Creditors and
Expenses of Bankruptcy Administration, 70 N.C. L. REv. 417, 452-55 (1992).
8. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
9. 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1991).
10. Id at 252.
11. See supra note 6; infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
12. The first sentence of § 506(a) creates "a secured claim to the extent of the value of
such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property," while the second sentence
requires that "[sluch value ... be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the
proposed disposition or use of such property." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
The first sentence of § 506(a) suggests that the ultimate value to the creditor, what could
be achieved upon repossession and disposition, should guide the valuation. See In re Claeys,
81 B.R. 985, 992 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987). Study of the first sentence alone would lead to foreclosure value in all instances because the maximum a creditor can realize upon repossession
and sale is the foreclosure value. Id. at 991.
The language of the second sentence, standing alone, produces two possible results:
where a debtor plans to retain collateral, consideration of the "proposed disposition or use"
indicates that market value is appropriate; where a debtor plans to allow sale of the asset, the
foreclosure value is appropriate. In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1019 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1988).
13. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
14. While the majority of courts ultimately rely on the foreclosure value as the valuation
method, courts use a variety of other methods to arrive at this value. See, eg., James F.
Queenan, Jr., Standardsfor Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter11, 92 COM. L.J. 18, 19,
31 (1987).
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Further, courts should adjust this value to reflect any decrease in value
from the use of the property. 5
In early 1989, Peter Gordon Balbus filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, listing $324,050 in secured debts
and $95,019 in unsecured debts in his petition schedules. 6 Brown & Co.

Securities Corp. (Brown), a secured creditor, asserted that although
Balbus planned to retain his real property, the court should subtract prospective liquidation costs from the valuation of the real estate collateral.' 7 Subtracting this fictional liquidation expense would have reduced
the value of Balbus's real property security by $16,950, correspondingly

increased the unsecured debt to $111,969, and disqualified Balbus from
Chapter 13 relief.'8 Brown accordingly moved to dismiss the Chapter 13
case or, in the alternative, to have the case converted to a Chapter 7
liquidation proceeding.' 9

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Brown's motion and held that hypothetical sales costs
should be ignored in calculating the value of secured assets that will remain in the debtor's possession.20 In an unpublished decision, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia affirmed the
decision of the bankruptcy court and later denied Brown's motion for
reconsideration. 21
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, affirming the district court ruling, held that potential

sales costs should not be factored into a section 506(a) valuation when
the Chapter 13 reorganization plan allows the debtor to keep the property providing security for his debt.2 2 Noting that the preferred method

of valuation depends on the emphasis supplied to the first and second
15. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
16. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 247. The parties concurred that "unsecured debts" should include the undersecured portion of secured claims. Brief of Appellant at 3, Balbus (No. 902067); see In re Jerome, 112 B.R. 563, 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). Balbus's undersecured
debt, totalling $37,050, thus was classified with his unsecured debt of $57,968 to arrive at a
total of $95,018 of unsecured debt.
17. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 248.
18. Id ; see supra note 1. To recoup a larger amount, creditors generally urge a higher
valuation for secured debt. See, eag., In re Crockett, 3 B.R. 365, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980).
19. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 247. The valuation issue arose in the overall context of plan
confirmation. In re Balbus, 104 B.R. 767, 767 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Brown
& Co. Sec. Corp. v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1991).
20. In re Balbus, 104 B.R. 767, 770 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Brown & Co.
See. Corp. v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1991).
21. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 247.
22. Id. at 252.
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sentences of section 506(a), 23 the court acknowledged that deducting
sales costs when a debtor plans to keep the collateral emphasizes the
statutory requirement that the "creditor's interest" be valued. 24 According to the court's analysis of the statute, however, deducting hypothetical
sales costs in all instances would render superfluous the second sentence
of section 506(a) by failing to consider the proposed use of the property. 25 Because Balbus planned to keep his real property, the court concluded that the sales costs were merely projections and should not be
considered.2 6
In arriving at its conclusion that hypothetical sales costs should not
be deducted, the court also examined the latter half of section 506(a),
which requires consideration of the purpose of the valuation. The court
concluded that the purpose of the valuation was to determine Balbus'
eligibility for Chapter 13 relief.27 The court feared that deducting "reasonable" sales costs could lead to manipulation of the section 109(e)
limits. 2 8
Finally, the court of appeals relied on the bankruptcy court's application of dictum in United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates,29 which analogizes the language "interest in property" appearing in section 506(a) to the same term used in section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the provision in question in Timbers.30 The Supreme
Court in Timbers concluded that in section 506(a) a "creditor's 'interest
inproperty' obviously means his security interest without taking account
of his right to immediate possession of the collateral upon default."3 1
23. For a discussion of the conflict between the two parts of § 506(a), see supra note 12.
24. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 248 (quoting In re Claeys, 81 B.R. 985, 990-91 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1987)).
25. Id. at 251. The court relied on the decisions of a "growing number of courts" that
deduct hypothetical liquidation costs only when the debtor proposes to sell the property. Id. at
249-50.

26. Id.
at 252.
27. Id at 251.
28. Id. The court reasoned that Congress had established a fixed, rather than variable,
limit on Chapter 13 eligibility in § 109(e). See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988). In light of this
legislative history, the court concluded that the inclusion of intrinsically unpredictable sales
costs as unsecured debt would defeat Congress's intention to establish a specific dollar limit on
eligibility. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 251.
29. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
30. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 250-51 (citing Timbers, 484 U.S. at 371-72).
31. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 372. The Supreme Court stated further that "[t]he phrase 'value
of such creditor's interest' in § 506(a) means 'the value of the collateral.'" Id
The debtor in Timbers filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11. United Savings Association, a secured creditor, sought relief from the automatic stay of foreclosure activity granted
in § 362(a) because of the absence of "adequate protection" required by § 362(d)(1). Id. at
368; see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay provision). The Court rejected the assertion that a
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The court of appeals in Balbus concurred with the bankruptcy court's

application of Timbers to show that the value of a secured creditor's interest should reflect solely the value of the collateral and should not depend on hypothetical sales costs.3 2 Relying on Timbers, the bankruptcy
court refused to subtract liquidation costs from Balbus's real property.3 3
Judge Murnaghan filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that Chapter
13 debtors should deduct liquidation costs from the valuation of secured
claims. Judge Murnaghan opined that the majority incorrectly premised

its statutory analysis on the assumption that the second sentence of section 506(a) requires calculating the value of the property to the debtor.34
Judge Murnaghan stressed that "such value" in the second sentence of

section 506(a) clearly refers to "creditor's interest" in the first sentence.35
The dissent stated that the creditor's interest must be calculated to reflect
the net amount that the creditor could receive upon repossession and sale
of the property.3 6 Judge Murnaghan explained that, regardless of the
debtor's retention of the property, subtracting hypothetical sales costs
from security value yields the net realizable value of collateral to secured
creditors.37

Moreover, in rejecting the majority's holding the dissent found the
Timbers dictum inapposite because Timbers did not address the issue of
hypothetical sales costs in a security valuation. 38 Judge Murnaghan sug-

gested that a more reasonable interpretation of the Timbers dictum is
that "'the value of such creditor's interest' in collateral cannot exceed
the 'value of the collateral' and therefore cannot include the creditor's

lost opportunity to take possession of the property."3 9
A majority of courts, consistent with Judge Murnaghan's statutory
interpretation in Balbus, have held that section 506(a) mandates valuacreditor's "interest in property" includes the right to immediate possession upon default and
consequently deserves reimbursement for deprivation of use during the period of the bankruptcy stay. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 370-72.
32. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 250-51; In re Balbus, 104 B.R. 767, 769-70 (Bankr. E.D. Va,
1989), aff'd sub nom. Brown & Co. See. Corp. v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir,
1991).
33. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 250-51.
34. Id. at 254 (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting).
35. Id (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting). To counter the majority's proposition that deducting
sales costs in all instances effectively eliminates the second sentence of § 506(a), Judge
Mumaghan argued that the first sentence is rendered mere surplusage by the majority's failure
to consider the creditor's interest. Id. (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting).
36. Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Murnaghan, J.,dissenting).
38. Id. at 255 (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting).
39. Id (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).

19921

RECENT CASES

tion of the creditor's interest in the property.'

1679

The creditor's interest

properly consists of what the creditor would receive upon repossession
and sale.4 To recover any value from the collateral, the secured creditor
would have to take possession and sell; the court, therefore, must determine what the creditor could realize upon disposition, accounting for the
time and expense incurred in so doing.4 2
Other courts express the alternate view, advanced by the majority in
Balbus, that section 506(a) commands deduction for liquidation expenses
only if the debtor plans to dispose of the collateral.4 3 These courts focus
on the second sentence of section 506(a) to determine that "the debtor's
intention is the cornerstone of the calculation."'
According to this
view, subtracting prospective liquidation costs in all situations would
render the second sentence of the statute "mere surplusage" by disregarding the use or disposition of the property.4 5 Furthermore, courts
endeavor to avoid a debtor's accruing gains by reason of her bankruptcy:
"[T]he debtors cannot eat with the hounds and run with the hares. Seeking retention of the property, they cannot insist on liquidation values to
be paid to the creditor in installments.""
The analysis of the court in Balbus, under the guise of protecting
consumer debtors in reorganization bankruptcy, fails in several respects.
First, the majority's reliance on Timbers was unfounded. The bankruptcy court opinion, upon which the court of appeals relied for its Tim40. See In re Balbus, 104 B.R. 767, 768 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd sub nor. Brown &
Corp. Sec. Co. v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Boring, 91 B.R.
791, 795 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
41. "The fact that a debtor intends to retain the collateral does not emasculate the fact
that it is in the first instance the creditor's interest in the collateral that must be valued." In re
Claeys, 81 B.R. 985, 991 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); see Valley Nat'l Bank v. Malody (In re
Malody), 102 B.R. 745, 749 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Smith, 92 B.R. 287, 290 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1988); Boring, 91 B.R. at 795; In re Petry, 76 B.R. 651, 653 (Bankr. C.D. IlM. 1987); In re
Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 873 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984); Cohen v. Werner (In re Cohen), 13 B.R. 350,
353 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Klein, 10 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Van Nort (In re Van Nort), 9 B.R. 218, 220-21 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981).
42. Claeys, 81 B.R. at 991.
43. See Beacon Hill Apartments, Ltd. v. Columbia Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Beacon Hill
Apartments, Ltd.), 118 B.R. 148, 151 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990); Wolk v. Goldome Realty
Credit Corp. (In re 222 Liberty Assocs.), 105 B.R. 798, 803 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re
Penz, 102 B.R. 826, 828 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989); In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016,
1019 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1988); Crouch v. Pioneer Fed. Say. Bank (In re Crouch), 80 B.R. 364,
366-67 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987); In re Robinson Ranch, Inc., 75 B.R. 606, 608 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1987); In re Fiberglass Indus., Inc., 74 B.R. 738, 742 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (Chapter
11); In re Courtright, 57 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986); In re Crockett, 3 B.R. 365, 367
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980).
44. Wolk, 105 B.R. at 803.
45. Courtright, 57 B.R. at 497; see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
46. Crockett, 3 B.R. at 367.
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bers discussion,47 admitted that Timbers did not address the problem that
the Balbus court faced: determining the value of a secured creditor's
interest.4" Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court directly translated the
Timbers dictum to Balbus's case, ignoring legislative history which indicates that valuation within the adequate protection context will differ
from the valuation for plan confirmation.4 9 Furthermore, applying the
Timbers dictum to claim valuation in the Balbus situation does not integrate the two sentences of section 506(a) since it always results in market
valuation. 50
Additionally, the court's maneuvering in Balbus failed to resolve the
impracticality of the section 109(e) debt limits. 5' The majority's conclusion, although purporting to protect unwary debtors from being squeezed
out of Chapter 13 by inclusion of excessive amounts of unsecured debt,
may place greater strain on debtors attempting to repay secured debt
undiminished by sales costs. Advocating the market-value approach actually could harm debtors whose unsecured debts are within the section
109(e) limits by requiring them to repay higher amounts of secured
debt. 2 The Balbus decision reflects an attempt by the court to manipulate the statutory mandate of section 109(e). Instead, the court should
have focused on expressing a workable framework for conducting section
506(a) valuations. The court felt unnecessarily apprehensive that deducting sales costs would eliminate various debtors from fling for reorganiza53
tion bankruptcy.
Finally, the Balbus court's reading of section 506(a) effectively eliminated the instruction in the first sentence to study the "creditor's interest." Similarly, courts that routinely deduct sales costs may ignore the
statutory mandate of the second half of section 506(a).5 4 A proper anal47. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 250-51.
48' In re Balbus, 104 B.R. 767, 769 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Brown & Co.
See. Corp. v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1991).
49. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5854; see supra notes 19, 31.
50. The dissent offered a more sagacious interpretation of the Timbers dictum. See supra
text accompanying note 39.
51. The § 109(e) limits were established in 1978 and have remained unchanged since that
time. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988).
52. Research has demonstrated that Chapter 13 debtors often experience difficulty adhering to their reorganization plans. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR
DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 4 (1989).
53. The Supreme Court, however, recently obviated the necessity ofjudicial manipulation
to permit an individual debtor to file in a reorganization Chapter rather than a liquidation
chapter. See Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2202 (1991) (holding that individuals may file
under Chapter 11).

54. Although they reach the proper result, courts that deduct sales costs in determining
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ysis of section 506(a) construes both sentences of the statute together.
The creditor's interest consists of the amount that he ultimately could
recover upon repossession and sale. The second sentence modifies the
first by focusing attention on the property's use or disposition in bankruptcy. Clearly, both sentences arrive at the liquidation value when
property will be liquidated. A dilemma arises, however, when a debtor
plans to retain collateral.
The interpretation enunciated by the court in In re Claeys,"5 a construction the Balbus dissent embraced,5 6 provides a desirable uniform
standard for the valuation of retained collateral in a reorganization bankruptcy. Courts first must value the creditor's interest in the collateral.
Consonant with a determination of the creditor's interest, sales costs
must be deducted. The second prong of the analysis parallels the second
sentence of section 506(a) and requires an examination of the use of the
property. If the use will reduce the property's value, the measure of
57
value should be adjusted accordingly.
Consistent application of the section 506(a) valuation provision
within the context of confirming a Chapter 13 reorganization plan is
needed to avoid the current unpredictable results attributable to the divergent judicial approaches. The Claeys approach-valuing the creditor's interest in the collateral and considering the use or disposition of
the property-offers sound statutory interpretation within feasible confines. If consistent sales costs are applied, the lower value of the secured
debt,58 although not favored by creditors, probably will result in the
creditor's recouping what she expected in negotiating the extension of
credit. The auspicious result of the Claeys analysis will be an increase in
the probability of success of debtors' reorganization plans and the creditors' receiving not only what they would receive on foreclosure, but also
some percentage of the undersecured portion of the debt.
STACEY

L. JOSEPH CARDENAS

the value of a secured claim often fail to acknowledge the necessity of applying the second half
of § 506(a) in tandem with the first half.
55. 81 B.R. 985, 991 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987).
56. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 254 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (citing Claeys, 81 B.R. at 992).
57. For an example of a use that would reduce collateral value, see Claeys, 81 B.R. at 992.
58. Legal vernacular frequently describes the confirmation of a bankruptcy reorganization
plan over the objections of a creditor as a "cramdown." See Queenan, supra note 14, at 19-20
(describing the semantics and mechanics of property valuation).

